

IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT

No. 26S-EX-00127

CITIZENS ACTION COALITION OF	)	Appeal from the Indiana Utility
INDIANA and VOTE SOLAR,	)	Regulatory Commission
	)	
Appellants,	)	IURC Cause No. 46193
	)	
v.	)	The Hon. James F. Huston, Chairman
	)	
DUKE ENERGY INDIANA, LLC and	)	The Hon. David E. Veleta and David E.
INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY	)	Ziegner, Commissioners
COMMISSION,	)	
	)	The Hon. Loraine Seyfried, Chief Admin.
Appellees.	)	Law Judge

BRIEF *AMICI CURIAE*
OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

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STATEMENT OF INTEREST

The *amici* are 23 non-profit organizations with a strong, undeniable interest in Indiana's recognition of the doctrine of associational standing. The overwhelming majority are membership organizations well-placed to make direct use of the doctrine for the benefit of their members and their organizational interests. Many have done so in a number of groundbreaking cases. But all have a comprehensive understanding of the irreplaceable role that associational standing plays in ensuring that legal wrongs do not go unvindicated and in promoting equal justice under the law. From the ACLU of Indiana to the National Rifle Association of America, the *amici* represent a broad range of interests, exist across the ideological spectrum, and advocate on a wide array of issues. They all recognize, however, that a membership organization is not meaningfully distinct from the individual members who have come together to advance their shared principles. They write to urge this Court to adopt the doctrine of associational standing.

A complete list of the *amici* is provided in an appendix to this brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the federal courts, associational standing is an application of Article III's injury-in-fact requirement, not an exception to it. After all, a membership organization "is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their views." *NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson*, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958). In other words, injury to the members of an organization on an issue germane to the organization's purpose *is* injury to the organization itself.

The contention that associational standing violates separation-of-powers principles fails to recognize this fundamental fact. Indeed, while this Court has consistently recognized several instances in which the jurisdiction of Indiana's courts is more expansive than their federal counterparts, it does not appear to have ever recognized a situation where the opposite is true. This should not be the first.

This is particularly so given the irreplaceable role that associational standing plays in ensuring that the doors of justice are open to everyone. Three rationales undergirding the doctrine are addressed here. First, associational standing allows legal violations to be remedied even when the costs of litigation outweigh its likely benefits with respect to any individual would-be plaintiff. Second, associational standing allows legal violations to be remedied even when individual would-be plaintiffs are ill-equipped to participate in the litigation process or are otherwise deterred from doing so. And third, associational standing ensures that complex issues of profound importance are resolved only after adversarial presentation by subject-matter experts. The elimination of this doctrine would do a profound disservice to all Hoosiers.

ARGUMENT

I. This Court should recognize the doctrine of associational standing

This Court has never held Indiana's standing doctrine to be more restrictive than its federal counterpart. And this is so for good reason: while federal courts are constrained by Article III of the United States Constitution to hearing actual cases and controversies, the Indiana Constitution imposes no similar limitation. Even

under the federal jurisdictional standard, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that, under appropriate circumstances, injury to an organization's members constitutes direct injury to the organization itself. If that is enough to invoke federal jurisdiction under Article III, it certainly suffices to bring a case within this Court's more relaxed standards. This Court should recognize associational standing.

A. The federal courts have long recognized that associational standing is consistent with Article III's injury-in-fact requirement

"Article III of the [U.S.] Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.'" *Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus*, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014). This limitation requires a federal plaintiff to demonstrate that they have suffered an "injury in fact" that is "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant" and that "will be redressed by a favorable decision." *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (cleaned up). "Supplementing these constitutional requirements, the prudential doctrine of standing has come to encompass several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." *United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc.*, 517 U.S. 544, 551 (1996) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Associational standing is an application of the injury-in-fact requirement, not an exception to it. This doctrine "recognizes that the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others." *Int'l Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock*, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986). After all, a membership organization "is

but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their views.” *NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson*, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958). Just as the organization’s members, united by some common purpose, come together to “amplify their own voices,” *Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC*, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring), the organization itself is little more than the product of those voices. Provided that “the interests [the organization] seeks to protect are germane to [its] purpose,” Article III therefore does not differentiate between injury to the individual and injury to the conglomeration. *Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n*, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).

Associational standing, in which an organization serves as the representative of its injured members, differs from third-party standing. Given that a plaintiff generally “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties,” *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975), only in rare circumstances will the violation of one person’s rights give rise to a claim by a different person. See *Kowalski v. Tesmer*, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004). By contrast, associational standing rests on the notion that an injury to an organization’s members *is* an injury to the organization. See *NAACP*, 357 U.S. at 459. To see the difference, one need look no further than *Warth*, which gave birth to *Hunt*’s three-prong test for determining the propriety of associational standing. See *Hunt*, 432 U.S. at 343 (quoting *Warth*, 422 U.S. at 515). There, the Court first rejected some plaintiffs’ attempt to claim that the challenged “zoning ordinance and practices violate the constitutional and statutory rights of third parties,” 422 U.S. at 509, before separately rejecting an organizational

plaintiff's standing because it had failed to allege that any of its members suffered injury, *id.* at 516. Were associational standing simply a breed of third-party standing, there would have been no need to differentiate between the two.

B. The recognition of associational standing does not raise separation-of-powers concerns

Of course, “[w]hile Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases or controversies, the Indiana Constitution does not contain any similar restraint.” *In re Lawrance*, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991). Nonetheless, the separation-of-powers clause of the Indiana Constitution “fulfills a similar function” to Article III’s “‘case or controversy’ requirement.” *Pence v. State*, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995). At the same time, this Court does not “permit overly formalistic interpretations of [this] clause to impede substantial justice.” *Id.*

Associational standing is consistent with the separation of powers. Any contention to the contrary rests on the erroneous assumption that associational standing is a breed of third-party standing. It is not. As set forth above, when an organization’s members are injured in a manner germane to the reasons that they came together in the first place, that injury belongs also to the organization itself. This direct injury ensures the “concrete adverseness” necessary to invoke a court’s jurisdiction. *Brock*, 477 U.S. at 289 (citation omitted). But, aside from fundamentally misunderstanding the nature of associational standing, the notion that associational standing runs afoul of the separation-of-power clause rests on the precise sort of “overly formalistic interpretation” of that clause that this Court deems improper.

Given all this, our Court of Appeals has consistently upheld the viability of associational standing in Indiana. *See Citizens Action Coalition of Ind. v. Duke Energy Ind., LLC*, 268 N.E.3d 785, 790-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), *trans. denied*; *Indiv. Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind. v. Anonymous Plaintiff 1*, 233 N.E.3d 416, 432-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), *trans. denied*; *Bd. of Comm’rs in Cnty. of Allen v. Ne. Ind. Bldg. Trades Council*, 954 N.E.2d 937, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), *trans. denied*; *Save the Valley, Inc. v. Ind.-Ky. Elec. Corp.*, 820 N.E.2d 677, 679-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), *trans. denied*. These holdings presuppose that associational standing does not raise separation-of-powers concerns, and the uniformity of this authority should not be ignored.

C. This Court has repeatedly held that the jurisdiction of Indiana courts is more expansive than its federal counterpart

The abolishment of associational standing in Indiana would be extraordinary not only because of the co-extensive nature of the relationship between an organization’s injuries and its members’ injuries and because it would turn Indiana into an extreme outlier amongst the states. It would also be extraordinary because this Court has never before recognized a situation in which its jurisdiction is more limited than federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in at least three separate circumstances, this Court has held that the jurisdiction in Indiana is *more* expansive than its federal counterpart.

First, the doctrine of public standing—recognized in Indiana since the middle of the nineteenth century—represents “a viable exception to the general standing requirement.” *State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp.*, 790 N.E.2d 978, 980,

983 (Ind. 2003). Under this doctrine, a plaintiff suing to enforce public rather than private rights need not have an interest in the outcome of the litigation that differs from that of the general public, although they still must demonstrate that they have been injured. *See City of Gary v. Nicholson*, 190 N.E.3d 349, 352 (Ind. 2022); *Cittadine*, 790 N.E.2d at 980. By contrast, in the federal courts, Article III requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that a “particularized” injury, that is, one that affects them “in a personal and individual way.” *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560 & n.1.

Second, the doctrine of taxpayer standing allows a taxpayer-plaintiff to challenge the appropriation of public funds when they “(1) raise a challenge seeking to vindicate an express constitutional limitation on the expenditure of public funds, (2) demonstrate some personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, and (3) show ‘extreme circumstances’ warranting judicial intervention.” *Horner v. Curry*, 125 N.E.3d 584, 596 (Ind. 2019). This is doubtless a narrow doctrine. But it is broader than its federal counterpart where, subject to rare exceptions, “the interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution does not give rise to the kind of redressable ‘personal injury’ required for Article III standing.” *Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found.*, 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007).

And third, the well-established “public interest exception to mootness” allows Indiana courts to reach the merits of otherwise-moot cases “when the issue involves a question of great public importance which is likely to recur.” *In re Tina T.*, 579 N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ind. 1991). This doctrine is significantly broader than its federal

counterpart, which requires both that the issue be capable of repetition as to the particular plaintiff and that it “be likely to evade review” in the future. *See, e.g., Murphy v. Hunt*, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam). This Court has repeatedly recognized these distinctions. *See, e.g., J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.*, 256 N.E.3d 1260, 1269-70 (Ind. 2025); *Lawrance*, 59 N.E.2d at 37 n.2.

All of this is to say that, if a theory of jurisdiction is viable in the federal courts, it is viable in Indiana. Associational standing should not be the first doctrine in which the jurisdiction of Indiana courts is deemed narrower than federal jurisdiction.

II. Associational standing plays an irreplaceable role in ensuring that legal rights do not go unvindicated

Our Court of Appeals has underscored several of the policy objectives served by associational standing. *See, e.g., Save the Valley*, 820 N.E.2d at 680-81. The *amici* write to emphasize three of these objectives.

A. Associational standing allows legal violations to be remedied even when the costs of litigation outweigh its likely benefits with respect to any individual would-be plaintiff

Litigation is a time-consuming, costly endeavor. By filing suit, plaintiffs open their lives to public scrutiny, subject themselves to discovery and countless other aspects of the legal process, and may assume responsibility for thousands of dollars (or more) in costs—not including attorneys’ fees. Associational standing ensures that legal violations may be remedied even when the costs of pursuing suit might outweigh the benefits for any individual plaintiff.

“Because individual lawsuits often cost more to bring than the victim would recover . . . aggregating claims has provided significant access to justice, as individual

members of these groups may be ‘in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do not know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive.’” Myriam Gilles, *Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the Civil Docket*, 65 Emory L.J. 1531, 1535 (2016) (citation omitted). The dangers inherent in preventing membership organizations from representing the interests of the persons they serve are felt most acutely by those with limited means. Not only are these individuals less able to absorb the cost of a separate lawsuit, but “low-income groups are more likely to experience violations of statutory rights that give rise to . . . collective legal claims.” *Id.* at 1537; *see also, e.g.*, Hope Peraria, Note, *Standing for Change: Associational Standing as an Aggregation Mechanism in Tenants’ Rights*, 31 Cardozo J. Equal Rts. & Soc. Just. 165, 180-84 (2024).

But even persons with means to pursue an individual lawsuit may have little incentive to do so. Consider, for instance, *AARP v. EEOC*, 267 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2017), in which AARP (one of the *amici* here) successfully challenged a federal regulation providing financial incentives for employer-sponsored wellness programs, which frequently require the disclosure of sensitive medical information. Any individual plaintiff would have subjected themselves to years-long litigation against the federal government, most likely requiring the disclosure in discovery of the same medical information the suit was designed to protect, all for the benefit of, at best, a modest decrease in insurance premiums. Associational standing ensures that this, and countless other cases, are heard.

For three reasons, these concerns are not mitigated by the possibility that some

group-wide violations may be remedied through class-action litigation. *See* Ind. R. Trial P. 23. First, in some circumstances, a class action is not even theoretically available. This case is a prime example: Indiana's trial rules only govern judicial practice, *see* Ind. R. Trial P. 1, and so there does not appear to be any mechanism for class-wide intervention before the agency. Second, even when theoretically available, not all legal claims are amenable to class treatment—either because a would-be plaintiff is not prepared to demonstrate that a sufficient number of persons have suffered the same deprivation, or for some other reason. Over the past several decades, a variety of factors have coalesced to increase the hurdles to successfully maintaining class status. *See* Robert H. Klonoff, *The Decline of Class Actions*, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 729, 745-823 (2013). And third, while the prospect of class treatment might assist an individual plaintiff in obtaining qualified counsel, it does not otherwise lessen their litigation burden. In fact, it might increase it. They will still subject themselves to the discovery process and to the other incidents involved in prosecuting a lawsuit, but would assume the additional responsibility of representing unnamed class members as well. In other words, for would-be plaintiffs deterred from pursuing litigation because the costs outweigh the potential benefits, that calculus is not likely to be meaningfully altered by the prospect of class treatment.

As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, the bottom line is that associational standing and class actions serve vastly different purposes. *See Int'l Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock*, 477 U.S. 274, 288-89

(1986). In the absence of associational standing, “[w]here the financial costs and the potential for retaliation are too high, some members may choose to abandon their claims entirely.” *Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC*, 551 P.3d 1037, 1042 (Wash. 2024).

That prospect serves no one.

B. Associational standing allows legal violations to be remedied even when individual would-be plaintiffs are ill-equipped to participate in the litigation process or are otherwise deterred from doing so

Aside from the actual costs of litigation, associational standing allows public-interest organizations to ensure that disaffected groups have their day in court even when individual plaintiffs are unlikely to come forward to seek redress.

Many of these organizations represent persons who—as a result of disability, mental illness, or similar impediment—are unlikely to be able to independently identify a potential legal violation, let alone locate a qualified attorney and meaningfully participate in the presentation of their case. Of necessity, associational standing has therefore been relied upon in a successful challenge to the prolonged institutionalization, without treatment, of incapacitated criminal defendants. *See Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink*, 322 F.3d 1101, 1119-22 (9th Cir. 2003). It has been relied upon to challenge a state law that excluded children with intellectual disabilities from public education. *See Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth*, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259-67 (E.D. Pa. 1971). It has been relied upon to challenge the unnecessary institutionalization of persons with mental illness as violative of the *Olmstead* mandate. *See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson*, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 319-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). And it has been relied upon to successfully

challenge a state's failure to make absentee voting procedures available to those with visual impairments. *See Nat'l Fed'n of Blind v. Lamone*, 813 F.3d 494, 505-10 (4th Cir. 2016).

In some instances, individuals otherwise capable of navigating the legal system may nonetheless be profoundly disincentivized from doing so. Consider, for instance, persons without status or other members of the immigrant community. Regardless of their capacity to do so, and despite their glaring need for legal representation, many of these individuals are understandably reluctant to seek vindication of their rights. Associational standing routinely fills this gap. *See, e.g., Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Noem*, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 81-99 (D.D.C. 2025), *appeal pending*, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir.); *Idaho Org. of Res. Councils v. Labrador*, 780 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1039-45 (D. Idaho 2025); *Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance v. Bullock*, 371 P.3d 430, 440-44 (Mont. 2016).

In other instances, membership organizations have initiated high-profile litigation on a wide range of controversial issues where individual plaintiffs might prove hesitant to serve as the standard-bearer. *See, e.g., Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College*, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) (race-conscious admissions policies); *N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) (Second Amendment); *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc.*, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (military recruitment on campus); *American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport*, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010) (Establishment Clause). In these cases, associations “can create a special level of protection for individual plaintiffs by

serving as the public face of such lawsuits, which insulates individuals from public scrutiny and also any potential for violence.” Mitchell Brost, Note, *Standing in the Shadows: Member Anonymity in Associational Standing Cases*, 53 Pepp. L. Rev. 195, 228 (2026). This role has become even more important in recent years, where heated political rhetoric and the prevalence of social media—the latter of which serves both to create easy access to personal information and to enable arms-length harassment of private individuals—have combined to render participation in high-profile litigation an altogether dangerous endeavor. *Cf. La Liberte v. Reid*, 966 F.3d 79, 84-95 (2d Cir. 2020) (detailing the online harassment and hate mail, “including threats of mutilation and recommendations that she commit suicide,” suffered by a woman who spoke on a controversial issue for two minutes at a city council meeting).

And this is to say nothing of the possibility that individual plaintiffs will be deterred from filing suit by the fear of “retaliation by officials responsible for executing the challenged policies.” *Save the Valley*, 820 N.E.2d at 681; *see also, e.g., Preservation Soc’y of Charleston v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control*, 845 S.E.2d 481, 487 (S.C. 2020) (“An additional advantage [to associational standing] noted in some jurisdictions is that organizations are generally less susceptible than individuals to retaliation by offices responsible for executing the challenged policies.”). In a wide variety of subject areas—civil rights, employment, and consumer protection, to name a few—individual plaintiffs often have an ongoing reliance on the very entities against whom they possess a viable legal claim. Allowing a membership organization to serve as the public face of the ensuing lawsuit, whether or not

individual plaintiffs are also involved, undeniably reduces the likelihood that persons will be deterred from seeking redress.¹

C. Associational standing ensures that complex issues of profound importance are resolved only after adversarial presentation by subject-matter experts

Associational standing also ensures that courts resolve complex legal questions only with the benefit of adversarial presentation by subject-matter experts. By their very nature, actions brought by membership organizations allow persons “to pool their . . . legal expertise to help ensure complete and vigorous litigation of the issues.” *Save the Valley*, 820 N.E.2d at 680-81; *see also, e.g., Conn. Ass’n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell*, 508 A.2d 743, 748 (Conn. 1986).

“Besides financial resources, organizations often have specialized expertise and research resources relating to the subject matter of the lawsuit that individual plaintiffs lack.” *Brock*, 477 U.S. at 289. This “interest and expertise” of an organizational plaintiff, “when exerted on behalf of its directly affected members, assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon

¹ To be sure, in rare circumstances an individual plaintiff may be permitted to proceed pseudonymously. *See, e.g., Doe v. Town of Plainfield*, 860 N.E.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), *trans. denied*. But the standard for doing so is rigorous and can never be guaranteed pre-litigation. Even when pseudonymity is permitted, the litigation may require the disclosure of sufficient personal information to reveal the plaintiff’s true identity, particularly with the use of modern internet-based tools: the recent use of artificial intelligence to promptly identify a federal judge who had been privately reprimanded is but one glaring example. *See* Joe Patrice, *Judiciary Tried to Hide ‘Sex in Chambers’ Judge’s Name*, Above the Law, May 28, 2026, at <https://abovethelaw.com/2026/05/judiciary-tried-to-hide-sex-in-chambers-judges-name-it-left-a-roadmap-to-identify-eleanor-ross-instead> (last visited July 13, 2026). And, aside from all this, pseudonymity will never prevent the disclosure of a plaintiff’s identity to the defendants and their counsel.

which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult questions.” *Id.* (cleaned up). Even Justice Scalia—hardly a proponent of a broad interpretation of standing principles—saw a benefit to having issues presented by “national organizations such as the NAACP or the American Civil Liberties Union that have a keen interest in the abstract question at issue in the case,” even though the standing doctrine prohibited them from bringing suit “unless they can attach themselves to some particular individual who happens to have some personal interest (however minor) at stake.” Antonin Scalia, *The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers*, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 891-92 (1983).

This expertise, nearly always present when an organization files suit on behalf of its members, is felt even more acutely in cases requiring high levels of specialization. Consider, for instance, the frequency with which associational standing is relied upon for the adjudication of issues of environmental law. *See, e.g., American Rivers v. FERC*, 895 F.3d 32, 40-42 (D.C. Cir. 2018); *Sierra Club v. FERC*, 827 F.3d 59, 65-68 (D.C. Cir. 2016); *Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA*, 233 F.3d 625, 635-37 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Even understanding the factual underpinnings of a claim may require a legal and scientific knowledge-base far beyond that of any potential individual plaintiff. Organizations dedicated to a cause, however, not only are able to quickly identify the factual and legal issues at play but may tap into “a pre-existing reservoir” of institutional knowledge—and of expert testimony—capable of ensuring a robust presentation. *Brock*, 477 U.S. at 289. And environmental adjudication does not stand alone: similar levels of expertise may be required for the proper

adjudication of cases concerning, *inter alia*, immigration, labor, consumer protection, or—as here—ratemaking. *Cf. Office & Prof. Employees Int’l Union, Local 2 v. FDIC*, 962 F.2d 63, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (a labor union “is better equipped to address the terms of the collective bargaining agreement it has negotiated than are the individual workers”).

Both the judiciary and the law itself only benefit when complicated issues are vigorously contested by parties with the resources and wherewithal to put their best foot forward. In a wide variety of circumstances, associational standing helps to ensure that this happens.

CONCLUSION

Not only does the doctrine of associational standing rests on solid legal footing, but it plays an irreplaceable role in ensuring the vindication of legal violations. The Court should recognize the viability of the doctrine.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 24, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing document using the Indiana E-filing system (IEFS). I also certify that on July 24, 2026, the foregoing document was served on the following persons by operation of IEFS:

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AARP

AARP Foundation

ACLU of Indiana

The Arc of Indiana

Common Cause

Hoosier Asian American Power

Indiana Apartment Association

Indiana Association for Home and Hospice Care, Inc.

Indiana Cast Metals Association

Indiana Community Action Association (IN-CAA)

Indiana Conference of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)

Indiana CURE

Indiana Justice Project

Indiana State Rifle & Pistol Association

Indiana Voices

IYG, Inc.

James Madison Center for Free Speech

Local 150 International Union of Operating Engineers

National Rifle Association of America

National Rural Education Association

National Waste and Recycling Association

Property Rights Alliance

Retired Indiana Public Employees Association